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INTRODUCTION 
 
Law enforcement’s use of Global Positioning System (GPS) de-
vices continues to expand as the technology gains recognition as an 
efficient, accurate, and inexpensive method to monitor a suspect’s 
public movement in automobiles.1 Federal courts have generally up-
held the warrantless use of these devices and determined they do not 
infringe an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to a “reasonable 
expectation of privacy”.2 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit, however, has recently held that the warrantless use 
of GPS devices to monitor vehicle movements on public roads is un-
lawful when used over a prolonged period.3 The D.C. Circuit based 
this holding on the belief that long term GPS tracking reveals “the 
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 1 Adam Koppel, Note, Warranting a Warrant: Fourth Amendment Concerns 
Raised by Law Enforcement’s Warrantless Use of GPS and Cellular Phone Tracking, 
64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1061, 1064 (2010). 
 2 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 3 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
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whole of one’s movements”4 and that this collection of movements 
reveals “more … than the sum of its parts.”5  
Regrettably, the D.C. Circuit’s analysis and decision inserts new 
variables into the already complicated equation used to assess the law-
fulness of warrantless surveillance by law enforcement agencies. This 
decision has split the federal circuits and produced two immediate 
issues for D.C. Circuit law enforcement. First, since “collections of 
movements” can also be gathered through previously lawful visual 
surveillance, the court’s ruling creates confusion for law enforcement 
regarding what quantity and type of surveillance results in suspect 
data that is more than “the sum of its parts.”6 Second, the tipping point 
for unlawful surveillance is unknown since “conduct that is initially 
constitutionally sound could later be deemed impermissible if it be-
comes part of the aggregate.”7  
This Note contends that by adhering to an analytical framework 
provided by Supreme Court precedent, the D.C. Circuit could have 
arrived at the same conclusion without the need to establish a deriva-
tive approach of assessing the Fourth Amendment’s right to privacy. 
Part I outlines the Supreme Court decisions establishing the modern 
approach to privacy protection and what constraints the judiciary has 
placed on law enforcement’s warrantless use of technology used to 
track automobile movement. Part II then provides an overview of law 
enforcement’s use of GPS technology and identifies a framework for 
warrantless use of this technology. Finally, Part III concludes with a 
review of the D.C. Circuit’s holding in United States. v. Maynard and 
an application of the analytical framework to the facts of that case.  
 
I. UNDERPINNINGS OF ANALYSIS: THE SUPREME 
COURT’S DECISIONS ESTABLISHING REASONABLE 
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY 
 
A. Fourth Amendment Protection and Katz 
 
The Fourth Amendment states that “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreason-
able searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause … describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”8 This Constitutional 
  
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 392 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
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protection provides a judicial safeguard intended to check the execu-
tive branch’s law enforcement powers and ensure individuals are not 
secure “only in the discretion of the police.”9 But, the protections of 
the Fourth Amendment are not absolute since, “the Fourth Amend-
ment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to 
the public … is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection … 
[b]ut what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible 
to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”10 
In Katz v. United States, the Supreme Court re-assessed the 
boundaries of privacy in a case involving the government’s use of an 
electronic listening device to eavesdrop on the defendant’s conversa-
tions within an enclosed public telephone booth.11  Shifting the ques-
tion of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search 
and seizure from “areas” to people, the majority held that “[t]he Gov-
ernment’s activities … violated the privacy upon which [the defen-
dant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus con-
stituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.”12 As a result of this decision, the personal right to a 
“justifiable … expectation of privacy”13 was affirmed and electronic 
intrusions by the government into this sphere of privacy expectations 
were equated with a physical intrusion.14 Essentially, the Court deter-
mined that the means of intrusion were irrelevant if the end result was 
the violation of an individual’s reasonable privacy expectations. 
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion expanded upon the majority’s 
articulation of a “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy ….”15 Justice Harlan’s analysis of prior decisions and the ma-
jority holding in Katz led to his conclusion that there was a “twofold 
requirement” used to determine whether an individual has legitimate 
expectations of privacy under the Fourth Amendment: 1) did the per-
son “exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and 2) 
was the expectation “one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘rea-
sonable’?”16  
Expanding upon this rule, Justice Harlan noted that a person’s 
home is a location where both the individual and society would rec-
  
 9 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (quoting Beck v. State of 
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 97 (1964)). 
 10 Id. at 351. 
 11 Id. at 348. 
 12 Id. at 353. 
 13 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 14 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. 
 15 Id. at 360. 
 16 Id. at 361. 
                    JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET [Vol. 3:1] 
ognize a reasonable expectation of privacy, “but objects, activities, or 
statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not 
‘protected’ because no intention to keep them to himself has been 
exhibited.”17 Applying this evaluation to the facts in the case, Justice 
Harlan concluded that although a telephone booth is accessible to the 
public “it is a temporarily private place whose momentary occupants’ 
expressions of freedom from intrusion are recognized as reasonable” 
and thus the government’s intrusion into the defendants’ privacy was 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.18 In later decisions, the “lower 
courts … came to rely upon the Harlan elaboration, as ultimately did a 
majority in the Supreme Court.,”19 Federal courts applied this Fourth 
Amendment “Katz” standard in cases where an individual “invoking 
its protection can claim … a ‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ that 
has been invaded by government action.”20  
Since the decision in Katz, federal courts have continued to apply 
this standard when assessing the use of surveillance technology by 
law enforcement in opposition to a suspect’s reasonable expectation 
of privacy. Using the Katz standard, federal courts have authorized 
law enforcement’s warrantless use of numerous surveillance tech-
niques including aerial photography,21 videotape surveillance,22 
searches of curbside trash,23 airborne visual surveillance,24 canine 
sniffs,25 chemical field tests,26 file access through peer-to-peer file 
sharing,27 and location tracking of airplanes.28 Although the Supreme 
Court has not yet ruled on a case involving the warrantless use of GPS 
technology,29 it has held that law enforcement can track the location 
of an automobile travelling on public roads without a warrant. 
 
B. Privacy on Public Roads and Knotts 
  
17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.1(b), at 434 (4th ed. 2004). 
 20 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740. 
 21 Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
 22 United States v. Leon Davis, 326 F.3d 361 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 23 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988). 
 24 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (authorizing the use of helicopters); 
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (authorizing the use of airplanes). 
 25 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). 
 26 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984). 
 27 United States v. Borowy, 595 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 28 United States v. Butts, 729 F.2d 1514 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 29 That will soon change with the Court’s imminent decision in United States 
v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. granted sub nom. United States v. 
Jones, 131 S. Ct. 3064 (2011). 
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The Supreme Court first applied the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” concept to law enforcement’s use of a technological device 
to track the movements of a car in United States v. Knotts.30 In Knotts, 
a “beeper” had been placed in a five-gallon drum of chemicals that the 
suspect subsequently purchased and transported by vehicle to a cabin 
in rural Wisconsin.31 By following the suspect’s vehicle “using both 
visual surveillance and a monitor which received the signals sent from 
the beeper”32 the police were able to eventually locate a narcotics 
laboratory owned by the defendant in the rural woodland of Wiscon-
sin.33 The defendant challenged the government’s warrantless use of 
the tracking device as a Constitutional violation of the Fourth 
Amendment’s protection of an individual’s reasonable expectations of 
privacy.34  
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the “governmental sur-
veillance … in this case amounted principally to the following of an 
automobile on public streets and highways”35 and commented that it 
has consistently held that there is a “diminished expectation of privacy 
in an automobile ….”36 Further, the Court stated “[a] car has little 
capacity for escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares 
where both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”37 Finally, 
the Court explicitly declared that “[a] person travelling in an automo-
bile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in his movements from one place to another.”38 The suspect’s move-
ments in this instance were, in the Court’s view, a voluntary convey-
ance of information “to anyone who wanted to look.”39  
Since the suspect’s vehicle was always visible along the route to 
the cabin, the Court held that there could be no expectation of privacy 
even when law enforcement did not maintain constant visual surveil-
lance of the automobile.40 Moreover, the Court noted that the suspect 
could not expect privacy once he drove his automobile off the public 
highway and entered the defendant’s premises since the vehicle was 
  
 30 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). 
 31 Id. at 278. 
 32 Id. at 278-79. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 279. 
 35 Id. at 281. 
 36 Id.  
 37 Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
 38 Id. at 281. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. at 281-82. 
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still subject to visual surveillance from public places near the cabin.41 
Although the “beeper” technology enabled the police to monitor the 
suspect’s automobile movements without requiring constant visual 
contact, “[n]othing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police 
from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth 
with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in 
this case.”42  
The Court in Knotts established no limits on the length or extent 
of surveillance conducted under this “public thoroughfare” standard 
and held that technology that supports and enables police efficiency is 
not presumptively unconstitutional.43 Addressing the specific issue of 
the sense-enhancing nature of the surveillance technology employed, 
the Court found that “scientific enhancement of this sort raises no 
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also raise.”44 
The Court concluded that, “[i]nsofar as respondent’s complaint ap-
pears to be simply that scientific devices such as the beeper enabled 
the police to be more effective in detecting crime, it simply has no 
constitutional foundation. We have never equated police efficiency 
with unconstitutionality, and we decline to so now.”45  
Despite the Knotts’ holding, subsequent Supreme Court decisions 
would limit law enforcement’s warrantless use of science and tech-
nology when it was deemed either overly invasive or “extrasensory.”46 
Federal courts have considered technology to be overly invasive when 
used to penetrate a recognized zone of privacy, such as a home.47 The 
courts consider technology to be “extrasensory” when not simply 
augmenting or assisting the human senses.48 In each situation, the 
warrantless use of such a technology is regarded as a violation of rea-
sonable expectations of privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
C. Limits on the Warrantless Use of Technology: Karo and 
Kyllo 
 
When faced with the overly invasive use of technology by law en-
forcement in United States v. Karo, the Supreme Court found, “[i]t is 
the exploitation of technological advances that implicates the Fourth 
  
 41 Id. at 282. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 284. 
 44 Id. at 285. 
 45 Id. at 284. 
 46 Renee McDonald Hutchins, Tied Up In Knotts? GPS Technology and the 
Fourth Amendment, 55 UCLA L.REV. 409, 456 (2007).  
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
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Amendment, not their mere existence.”49 Finding such an exploitation 
in Karo, the Court held the  Fourth Amendment is violated when 
technology is used in areas not open to visual surveillance where indi-
viduals have a “justifiable interest” in privacy.50 The technology im-
plicated in Karo, a beeper similar to the one used by law enforcement 
in Knotts, was attached to a can of ether that was expected to be used 
by the suspect to extract cocaine from clothing.51 As the can of ether 
moved to different locations, law enforcement agents monitored its 
movement through “both visual and beeper surveillance.”52 Eventu-
ally, the ether can was moved by vehicle to a private residence and 
agents later determined, using just the beeper, that the can had been 
moved inside the residence.53 Therefore, using information derived 
solely from the beeper attached to the ether can, federal agents were 
able to ‘locate the ether in a specific house” and use that information 
“to secure a warrant for the search of the house.”54 
However, unlike the use of the beeper in Knotts, law enforcement 
obtained information in Karo “that it could not have otherwise ob-
tained without a warrant.”55 Although the suspect automobile in 
Knotts was not under constant visual surveillance, he did not have an 
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the opinion of the 
Court, since travel on public roads voluntarily conveys information to 
third parties.56 In Karo, however, there was no opportunity for visual 
surveillance. Once the ether can moved into a private residence, there 
was a justifiable expectation of privacy “free of governmental intru-
sion not authorized by a warrant … that society is prepared to recog-
nize ….”57 Consequently, the Supreme Court declared the warrantless 
use of the beeper in Karo to be “[i]ndiscriminate monitoring of prop-
erty … withdrawn from public view” that violates privacy interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.58 
Seventeen years after its decision in Karo, the Supreme Court was 
presented with an “extrasensory” governmental intrusion into personal 
privacy in Kyllo v. United States.59 In Kyllo, police officers used a 
thermal imaging device to determine that the defendant was using 
  
 49 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984). 
 50 Id. at 714. 
 51 Id. at 708. 
 52 Id. at 708-09. 
 53 Id. at 709-10. 
 54 Id. at 714. 
 55 Id. at 715. 
 56 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). 
 57 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984). 
 58 Id. at 716. 
 59 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
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“halide lights to grow marijuana in his house ….”60 The thermal scan-
ner used by the officers did not penetrate the interior of the resi-
dence’s walls, but instead detected the heat radiating from the home.61 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision 
of the lower court, finding that this was not an intrusion into the de-
fendant’s privacy.62 The court based its conviction affirmation on their 
conclusion that the defendant “had shown no subjective expectation of 
privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping 
from his home … and even if he had, there was no objectively reason-
able expectation of privacy because the imager ‘did not expose any 
intimate details of Kyllo’s life’.”63 The Supreme Court reversed the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision.64  
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority in Kyllo, declared that “ob-
taining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of [a] home that could not otherwise have been obtained with-
out physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ … con-
stitutes a search.”65 Thus, by limiting “technological enhancement” of 
lawful visual surveillance, this standard preserves the “degree of pri-
vacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted.”66 Importantly, the Kyllo decision stipulates that surveil-
lance where “the Government uses a device that is not in general pub-
lic use” to discover “unknowable” information constitutes a “search 
[that] is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”67 Unfortu-
nately, the Court declined to provide a definition for “general public 
use” in Kyllo and it has yet to elaborate on the limits implied by this 
language.68  
 
II. WHAT EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY DOES SOCIETY 
HAVE RELATED TO GPS TECHNOLOGY: AN 
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
  
 60 Id. at 30. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. at 31 (quoting United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 
1999)). 
 64 Id. at 41. 
 65 Id. at 34. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at 40. 
 68 Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Founders’ Privacy: The Fourth Amendment 
and the Power of Technological Surveillance, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (2002) 
(“Taken to its logical conclusion, Kyllo suggests that government use of new tech-
nologies should always be subject to the warrant requirement unless they are in gen-
eral public use.”). 
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A. The “General Public Use” of GPS Technology 
 
Federal courts lack a definition of “general public use,” yet they 
have been required to assess whether GPS technology fits within this 
classification. This produces mixed results.69 Factors complicating the 
determination include the number of GPS navigation devices pur-
chased and in use,70 consumer familiarity with these devices,71 and 
judicial confusion in distinguishing a GPS tracking device used by 
law enforcement from a more common consumer GPS navigation 
device.72 Generally, a consumer GPS navigation device provides sim-
ple current location functionality along with destination direction ca-
pabilities.73 However, law enforcement GPS tracking devices are 
much more powerful and covert, and they bear little resemblance to 
the simple beeper used by the police in Knotts that only provided “re-
lational pings.”74 
The GPS tracking devices used by law enforcement agents are 
small, inconspicuous devices that can be attached anywhere on a ve-
hicle.75 Self-powered, these GPS devices have a battery life of “many 
  
 69 See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 n.10 (D. Mass. 
2010) (noting that the GPS in question, which the court found to be “highly sophisti-
cated” was in general public use because of the wide availability of GPS units).  
 70 See, e.g., Kevin J. O’Brien, Smartphones cut ground out from under navi-
gation devices, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 14, 2010, at 14 (“[T]he number of personal 
navigation devices shipped globally will peak in 2011 at 42 million, up from 40 mil-
lion this year.”). 
 71 See, e.g., Ludovic Privat, NAVTEQ: Continued Growth in Consumer 
Navigation Use, GPS BUSINESS NEWS (Feb. 12, 2011), 
http://www.gpsbusinessnews.com/NAVTEQ-Continued-Growth-in-Consumer-
Navigation-Use_a2812.html (noting that in 2009, “46% of American consumers 
surveyed reported having experience with a GPS navigation device or application.”). 
 72 See Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 393 n.10 (explaining that the GPS in ques-
tion, which allowed the FBI to accurately locate Sparks’ vehicle at any time from any 
computer was highly sophisticated, but did not require a warrant under Kyllo because 
“GPS devices are widely available to the public at large.”). 
 73 See, e.g., GPS Buying Advice, GPS features, CONSUMERREPORTS.ORG, 
http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/cars/tires-auto-parts/gps/gps-buying-advice/gps-
features/gps-features.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2011). 
 74 See, e.g., Sparks, 750 F.Supp. 2d 384 at 393 (“It is true that the GPS de-
vice used here was highly sophisticated, allowing the FBI accurately to locate Spark’s 
vehicle from any computer, at any time of the day or night, and store a record of his 
travels for the entirety of the eleven day period. This is certainly more advanced than 
the relational “pings” of the beepers of yesteryear.”). 
 75 See, e.g., Deleware v. Holden, C.A. No. 10-03-0545, 2010 WL 5140744, 
at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 14, 2010) (stating that “GPS devices operated by batteries 
permit the device to be attached anywhere on a vehicle”); and id. at 5-6 n. 3 (stating 
that “GPS devices that do not have their own internal battery source must be placed 
such that they can be attached to the vehicle’s battery.”). 
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weeks” and they are generally equipped with a recorder and often a 
transmitter as well.76 Those equipped with a transmitter allow for real-
time tracking of a suspect vehicle and have the ability to create a re-
cord of the target’s activity.77 Other GPS tracking devices are 
equipped with a recording device that “automatically keeps a detailed 
time and place itinerary of everywhere the vehicle travels and when 
and how long it remains at various locations.”78 With these devices, 
law enforcement agents are no longer required to continuously moni-
tor suspect automobiles; agents can simply remove the device from 
the vehicle at their convenience and download the results.79  
Therefore, unlike beeper technology, GPS tracking does not 
merely augment visual surveillance, but, instead, equips law enforce-
ment with a “technological substitute for traditional visual tracking.”80 
Moreover, GPS tracking devices provide law enforcement with me-
ticulous logs, which include intimate details of a tracked individual’s 
past activities81―regardless of lawfulness.  This surveillance provides 
law enforcement with valuable “information not otherwise available 
to the government” because it cannot maintain persistent long-term 
surveillance of a suspect vehicle without “extrasensory” electronic 
support.82 GPS devices, unlike beepers, do not simply transmit “‘Here 
  
 76 See, e.g., id  at 5 (stating that “[t]he battery on a GPS device can last for 
many weeks without needing to be recharged.”). 
 77 See, e.g., id.  at *6 (“GPS receivers equipped with a transmitter can easily 
record and relay relatively accurate positional information 24 hours a day to third-
parties.”). 
 78 Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy on the Open Road, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 295, 
317 (2004) (explaining that the GPS devices attached to vehicles keep detailed logs of 
where the vehicles travel). 
 79 See, e.g., id. (describing the removal, “[l]ater, law enforcement agents 
remove the device and download the detailed itinerary of where and when the vehicle 
has traveled. Unlike beepers, GPS devices do not require continuous monitoring by a 
law enforcement agent.”). 
 80 State v. Jackson, 150 Wash.2d 251, 262 (Wash. 2003) (describing that 
“unlike binoculars or a flashlight, the GPS device does not merely augment the offi-
cers’ senses, but rather provides a technological substitute for traditional visual track-
ing.”). 
 81 See, e.g., id. (finding that “intrusion into private affairs made possible with 
a GPS device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a great deal 
about an individual’s life”). 
 82 United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 865-67 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d en 
banc by an equally divided court, 537 F.2d 227 (1976) (holding that without the 
beeper’s aid, the agents would not have been able to seize evidence that implicated 
Holmes. However, the issue in cases involving electronic monitoring is whether the 
government has invaded an individual’s “right of personal security, personal liberty, 
and private property[.]”) (citations omitted)).  
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I am;’”83 rather, this technology communicates “[h]ere I am, here is 
where I have been, and here is how long I was there.”84 
Regrettably, familiarity with the commercial application of GPS 
technology can create misperceptions regarding the intrusiveness of 
the GPS tracking devices used by law enforcement.85 Furthering the 
confusion, American society now utilizes GPS tracking devices for 
more than simple vehicle navigation, such as for tracking truant stu-
dents,86 probationary criminals,87 children,88 and school buses.89 How-
ever, these methods of use of GPS tracking are either consensual or 
court-ordered, and State concern over the misuse of GPS tracking has 
led to the development of statutory proscriptions in some jurisdictions 
against private GPS device tracking.90 Interwoven into the complica-
  
 83 See, e.g., id. at 865 n.12 (“The beacon does convey information as useful 
as any obtained from a wiretap. As Judge Tuttle of this panel observed at oral argu-
ment, the beeper continually broadcasts the statement, ‘Here I am’.”). 
 84 See, e.g., Jackson, 76 P.3d at 221 (explaining that the GPS device attached 
to the suspect’s car kept a log of where he went and how long he stayed at each loca-
tion). 
 85 See, e.g., State v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 393 n.10 (D. Mass. 2010) 
(grouping the “highly sophisticated” GPS devices used by law enforcement agents 
with those available to the general public). 
 86 Eric Carpenter, Kids Who Skip School are Tracked by GPS, THE ORANGE 
COUNTY REGISTER (Feb. 17, 2011. 1:54 PM), 
http://www.ocregister.com/news/school-288730-students-program.html. (describing 
how “[s]eventh- and eighth-graders with four unexcused absences or more” were 
assigned to carry a GPS device, and how “[e]ach morning on schooldays, they get an 
automated phone call reminding them they need to get to school on time.”). 
 87 See, e.g., Carlin DeGuerin Miller, Lindsay Lohan Has New Bracelet...the 
Ankle Monitoring Kind; Actress Gets Tougher DUI Probation Terms, CBS NEWS 
(May 24, 2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20005761-504083.html 
(“A Los Angeles judge ordered the troubled starlet to wear an ankle monitoring 
bracelet[.]”). 
 88 See, e.g., David Pogue, Cellphones that Track the Kids, N.Y. TIMES, De-
cember 21, 2006, at C1 (describing how “[a]t least five companies … have built 
G.P.S. tracking into something children carry voluntarily: cellphones.”). 
 89 See, e.g., Matt Fritz, GPS System to Track La Porte School Buses, THE 
HERALD ARGUS (Feb. 18, 2011, 5:06 PM), 
http://heraldargus.com/articles/2011/02/18/news/local/doc4d5dcd3e9d31e451810001.
txt (explaining the La Porte Community Schools purchased a GPS system to pinpoint 
buses at any time and to engage in efficient routing). 
 90 See, e.g., Electronic tracking device, CAL. PENAL CODE § 637.7 (West 
2010) (demonstrating an example of such a statutory proscription); Electronic track-
ing device; location of person without consent; prohibit, H.B. 16, 150th Gen. As-
semb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010) available at http://www.legis.ga.gov/legislation/en-
US/display/25877. 
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tion is the lack of a clear and concise definition for Kyllo’s “general 
public use” standard,91 further creating confusion for the judiciary.   
United States v. Sparks, a recent federal court decision, provides a 
ready example of the confusion stemming from Kyllo’s “general pub-
lic use” standard. Here, the district court evaluated the FBI’s warran-
tless use of a GPS tracking device to record and monitor a suspect 
vehicle that was eventually used in an armed bank robbery.92 The 
court recognized the device was “highly sophisticated,” that it allowed 
the FBI to accurately locate the suspect’s “vehicle from any computer, 
at any time of the day or night,” and that the FBI could use the GPS 
device “to store a record of [the suspect’s] travels for the entirety of 
the eleven day period.”93 Despite recognition of the GPS device’s 
capabilities, the court noted that “[t]his technology … is not the type 
of highly sophisticated equipment that would require a warrant under 
Kyllo.”94 Moreover, the court confused the device with navigational 
devices in “general public use,” stating that “GPS devices are widely 
available to the public at large.”95 Without further Supreme Court 
guidance, federal courts will likely continue to inconsistently apply 
prior precedent while law enforcement increases the warrantless use 
of GPS tracking devices 
 
B. Decision Framework 
 
To address this judicial confusion, the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment foundational holdings in Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo 
can be fashioned into a four-part framework to analyze the constitu-
tionality of warrantless GPS vehicle monitoring. When evaluating 
warrantless surveillance, Fourth Amendment protections must favor 
the individual’s privacy over the State’s need for information. This 
will “prevent stealthy encroachment upon or ‘gradual depreciation’ of 
the rights secured by them, by imperceptible practice of courts, or by 
well-intentioned, but mistakenly over-zealous, executive officers.”96 
  
 91 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (holding that using sense-
enhancing technology that is not in general public use to obtain information that could 
otherwise not have been obtained without physical intrusion into a “constitutionally 
protected area” constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment). 
 92 United States v. Sparks, 750 F. Supp. 2d 384, 385 (D. Mass. 2010) (noting 
that the vehicles involved in a robbery were located through the use of a GPS device). 
 93 Id. at 393. 
 94 Id. at 393 n.10. 
 95 Id. (likening the GPS to “the telephone in 1880 and the video camera in 
1950 …. Undoubtedly, a quarter-century from now, the GPS device used in this case 
will seem antiquated.”). 
 96 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921). 
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Because privacy is a “right” afforded by the Fourth Amendment, 
analysis of the warrantless use of GPS technology within this frame-
work requires a thorough review of each holding when assessing law 
enforcement’s need to seek a warrant. 
Utilizing the analytical framework requires sequential application 
of the decisions of Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo to the facts of a 
given case. First, a Katz analysis must be conducted when a defendant 
invokes Fourth Amendment privacy protections to identify whether 
the individual has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and 
whether this subjective privacy expectation is objectively reasonable 
to society.97 Second, per Knotts, a defendant can have no objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy when their automobile movements 
are wholly conducted in public or visible to the public.98 Third, Karo 
provides an exception to the prior rule provided by Knotts, that is, 
warrantless electronic monitoring cannot reveal information not vol-
untarily conveyed through public actions in situations where visual 
surveillance would have been an appropriate substitute for the elec-
tronic surveillance.99 Fourth, as stated in Kyllo, law enforcement can-
not use technology that is not in general public use to reveal either 
involuntarily conveyed or unknowable information where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy regarding that information.100  
  
 97 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(noting that the rule governing the evaluation of one’s Fourth Amendment protection 
looks to whether the person has exhibited an actual expectation of privacy and if the 
expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable); See also Smith 
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (finding that “the application of the Fourth 
Amendment depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a ‘justi-
fiable,’ a ‘reasonable,’ or a .legitimate expectation of privacy’ that has been invaded 
by government action …. The second question is whether the individual’s subjective 
expectation of privacy is ‘one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable’ …. 
“). 
 98 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983). (finding that “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in his movements from one place to another.”). 
 99 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (“The monitoring of an 
electronic device such as a beeper is, of course, less intrusive than a full-scale search, 
but it does reveal a critical fact about the interior of the premises that the Government 
is extremely interested in knowing and that it could not have otherwise obtained 
without a warrant. , , , [H]ere, as we have said, the monitoring indicated that the 
beeper was inside the house, a fact that could not have been visually verified.”). 
 100 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (finding that “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area,’ … constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technol-
ogy in question is not in general public use. This assures preservation of that degree 
of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was 
adopted.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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When analyzing the Fourth Amendment’s privacy protections, it 
is vital to note that “the decision to allow law enforcement to use 
emerging surveillance technologies is effectively a decision to expand 
government power at the expense of the public’s privacy and secu-
rity.”101 Thus, to protect public security and privacy, search warrants 
are scrutinized “by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being 
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”102 To do otherwise “would reduce the [Fourth] 
Amendment to a nullity.”103 Consequently, warrants are presump-
tively required when an intrusion into a Fourth Amendment “constitu-
tionally protected area”104 occurs and this is reflected in the decision 
paths of the analytical framework. The following diagram illustrates 
the logical flow: 
  
 101 Ku, supra note 68, at 1331. 
 102 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 103 Id. (noting that nullifying the warrant requirement would leave homes 
unprotected and “[t]he right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is a grave 
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in reason-
able security and freedom from surveillance.”). 
 104 See e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (noting that using sense-enhancing technol-
ogy to obtain information from the home that would not have been available other-
wise is “erod[ing] the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.”). 
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This analytical framework demonstrates that the application of 
Katz can immediately create a warrant requirement when an individ-
ual exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy that society views as 
objectively reasonable.  However, although Knotts can, and frequently 
will, override the subjective expectation of privacy when GPS track-
ing is involved, either Karo or Kyllo may provide an exception that 
establishes a warrant requirement, and therefore, each must be consid-
ered within the analysis. The Supreme Court’s interpretations of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection, as structured within the framework, 
ensures that law enforcement’s warrantless use of GPS technology is 
bound by the limits of the Amendment. 
 
III. APPLYING THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO 
MAYNARD 
 
In the recently-decided case, United States v. Maynard, the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia unnecessarily fashioned 
a new Fourth Amendment approach for the analysis of law enforce-
ment’s use of warrantless GPS monitoring instead of relying on 
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precedent.105 The court focused  on the Supreme Court’s statement in 
Katz that an individual’s knowing exposure of information results in 
no cognizable expectation of privacy, and the court went on to find 
that the appellant’s movements, as monitored by a warrantless GPS 
device, were not “actually” or “constructively” exposed to the pub-
lic.106 The modification of the “exposes to the public” standard from 
Katz107 required consideration of two additional concepts: evaluation 
of “what a reasonable person expects another might actually do,”108 
and the meta-information related to a “collection of movements.”109 
Although the court correctly concluded that law enforcement violated 
the Fourth Amendment in Maynard, the same conclusion could have 
been reached by the application of prior precedent and without the 
construction of a new approach. 
 
A. Right Answer, Wrong Approach: United States v. Maynard 
Inserts New Variables into the Equation 
 
In Maynard, the police attached a GPS tracking device to the de-
fendants’ vehicle without a warrant and monitored the vehicle’s 
movements for the following four weeks before arresting them for a 
variety of drug-related charges.110 The defendant that drove the car, 
Jones, argued that under the Katz standard the police had “violated his 
‘reasonable expectations of privacy ….’”111 Counsel for the govern-
ment countered that although the Katz test was relevant, Jones’s ex-
pectations of privacy were not reasonable based on the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Knotts.112 Contrary to the prior precedent of Knotts 
and other federal circuit court cases, however, the D.C. Circuit held 
that Jones’s objectively reasonable expectations of privacy were vio-
lated since the “totality of Jones’s movements over the course of a 
  
 105 United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 555-56 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding 
that Knotts did not control the case and that the police performed a search when they 
violated Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy). 
 106 Id. at 558 (noting that the totality of one’s movements over a month are 
“not actually exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe all 
those movements is effectively nil.” Further, the court notes that constructively, the 
whole of one’s movements is not exposed because the “whole reveals more—
sometimes a great deal more—than does the sum of its parts.”). 
 107 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (finding that “[w]hat a 
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”). 
 108 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559. 
 109 Id. at 560-561. 
 110 Id. at 555. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id.at 555-56. 
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month … was not exposed to the public ….”113 In arriving to this con-
clusion, the court first distinguished Maynard from the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Knotts.114 
Focusing on the Supreme Court’s statement in Knotts that “[a] 
person traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to 
another,”115 the court decided that the Supreme Court had “explicitly 
distinguished between the limited information discovered by the use 
of the beeper, movements during a discrete journey, and more com-
prehensive or sustained monitoring of the sort at issue in this case.”116 
Further, the Maynard court explained, “in Knotts the Court actually 
reserved the issue of prolonged surveillance. That issue is squarely 
presented in this case.”117 Therefore, from the D.C. Circuit’s perspec-
tive, the limited holding in Knotts distinguished it from the issues 
before it in Maynard, and so, it proceeded to analyze the warrantless 
use of GPS monitoring under the Katz legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy standard.118 
The court applied the Katz test by concentrating on the informa-
tion that the monitoring of Jones’s movements had been “exposed to 
the public” and evaluating whether Jones had an objectively reason-
able expectation of privacy regarding that information.119 First, the 
court reasoned that “unlike one’s movements during a single journey, 
the whole of one’s movements over the course of a month is not actu-
ally exposed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe 
all those movements is effectively nil.”120 The court then found that 
Jones’s movements were not exposed to the public because it would 
be very difficult, if not impossible, to track the movement of a person 
day after day and “week in and week out” until “all the places, people, 
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private 
routine” had been “identified.”121 In the court’s view, the proper ques-
tion should be “what a reasonable person expects another might actu-
ally do.”122 So, although a “theoretical possibility”123 existed for law 
  
 113 Id. at 558. 
 114 Id. at 555-56. 
 115 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 116 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 556. (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 
(1983)). 
 117 Id. at 558. 
 118 Id. at 558-59. 
 119 Id. at 558. 
 120 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 121 Id. at 560. 
 122 Id. at 559. 
 123 Id. at 560. 
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enforcement to monitor Jones’s movements, the question “depends … 
upon the actual likelihood of … discovery by a stranger.”124 Since 
“the likelihood a stranger would observe all those movements is not 
just remote, it is essentially nil,” the court found the collection of his 
movements were not voluntarily conveyed.125 
Second, the Maynard court determined that “the whole of one’s 
movements is not exposed constructively even though each individual 
movement is exposed, because that whole reveals more―sometimes a 
great deal more―than does the sum of its parts.”126 Noting that the 
“whole of Jones’s movements … was constructively exposed because 
each of his individual movements during that time was itself in public 
view” the court reviewed whether Jones should have an objectively 
reasonable expectation of privacy in his collection of movements.127 
Referencing Supreme Court decisions related to collections of data, 
the Maynard court found a precedential basis for determining that 
there are privacy expectations in a person’s “habits and patterns that 
mark the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life ….”128 
Stating that a reasonable person expects the collection of their move-
ments “to remain ‘disconnected and anonymous’,”129 the court con-
cluded that “the extended recordation of a person’s movements is … 
not what we expect anyone to do, and it reveals more than we expect 
anyone to know.”130 
Having found that Jones’s movements were not both “actually” 
and “constructively” exposed to the public, the court then analyzed 
whether “his expectations of privacy in those movements was reason-
able ….”131 Focusing on the majority opinion in Katz, the D.C. Circuit 
stated, “in Katz the Court clearly stated what [one] seeks to preserve 
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitu-
tionally protected.”132 The Maynard court found that applying the 
Katz test can “lead to only one conclusion: Society recognizes Jones’s 
expectation of privacy in his movements over the course of a month as 
reasonable, and the use of the GPS device to monitor those move-
ments defeated that reasonable expectation.”133 Although the court 
  
 124 Id.  
 125 Id.  
 126 Id. at 558 (emphasis in original). 
 127 Id. at 560-61. 
 128 Id. at 561-62. 
 129 Id. at 563 (quoting Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 572 
(N.Y. 1970) (Breitel, J., concurring)). 
 130 Id.  
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 THE WARRANTLESS USE OF GPS TRACKING DEVICES 
recognized that other federal circuits had held that GPS monitoring 
was not a search, the D.C. Circuit noted that the other Circuits were 
simply “not alert to the distinction drawn in Knotts between short-
term and prolonged surveillance ….”134  
Since the Maynard court created a new right of privacy in a col-
lection of movements, but also stressed, “[s]urveillance that reveals 
only what is already exposed to the public―such as a person’s 
movements during a single journey―is not a search,”135 the challenge 
for the police applying this new standard is now determining the level 
of surveillance that establishes a “pattern of movements” for any pro-
longed surveillance activities. Moreover, the Maynard court left unan-
swered whether prolonged monitoring of a vehicle through the war-
rantless use of a GPS tracking device always violates an individual’s 
reasonable expectations of privacy.136 Application of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions using the analytical framework provided by Katz, 
Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo could have resulted in a satisfactory result 
without splitting the federal circuits’ approach. 
 
B. Applying Katz 
 
When analyzing Fourth Amendment privacy protections, the Katz 
test is first applied to identify whether the individual has exhibited a 
subjective expectation of privacy and whether this subjective privacy 
expectation is objectively reasonable to society.137 Applying Katz to 
the facts of Maynard, it becomes clear that the defendant, Jones, did 
not invoke any Fourth Amendment privacy protections through the 
outward exhibition of a subjective expectation of privacy.138 Jones 
performed no actions to mask his individual or collective movements, 
even those as simple as using more than one vehicle when conducting 
his criminal activities or screening his car from exposure by placing it 
in a non-public parking space. Exposing “objects … to the ‘plain 
view’ of outsiders” removes those objects from the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment “because no intention to keep them to himself has 
been exhibited.”139  
  
 134 Id. at 564. 
 135 Id. at 565. 
 136 Id. at 566. 
 137 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id.; Contra Eric Dean Bender, The Fourth Amendment in the Age of Aerial 
Surveillance: Curtains for the Curtilage?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 725, 753 (1985) (“The 
essential focus of the Katz analysis is on the reasonableness of expectations of pri-
vacy; it is thus disingenuous for a court to evade consideration of that issue, under the 
second part of the Katz analysis, by failing to recognize that a dweller exhibited an 
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The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that evaluation of 
subjective expectations within the Katz standard can “provide an in-
adequate index of Fourth Amendment protection” when they have 
“been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to well-recognized Fourth 
Amendment freedoms” and “in such cases, a normative inquiry would 
be proper.”140 Such a “conditioning” can be properly perceived in an 
individual’s expectation that they are not under constant warrantless 
surveillance from their government141. Moreover, “searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magis-
trate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”142 Even 
when an individual expresses no subjective expectation of privacy, 
they are “entitled to know [they] will remain free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures” and that they are not “secure from Fourth 
Amendment violations only in the discretion of the police.”143  
Therefore, under the analytical framework, although the defendant 
in Maynard failed to exhibit a subjective intention that is objectively 
reasonable to society,144 this was not determinative of his right to pri-
vacy under the Fourth Amendment. It does, though, preclude an im-
mediate determination that law enforcement was required to obtain a 
warrant before using GPS tracking to monitor Jones’s movements.145 
 
C. Applying Knotts 
 
Employing Knotts to the facts in Maynard, however, reveals that 
Jones could not have had any objectively reasonable expectations of 
privacy regarding his movements conducted wholly on public streets 
or visible from public locations.146 Since all of the automobile move-
ments tracked in Maynard were conducted on public thoroughfares,147 
applying Knotts within the analytical framework does not result in a 
requirement for the police involved to have sought a warrant before 
their warrantless use of the GPS tracking device. This does not end 
the analysis, but instead advances to considerations of Fourth 
Amendment warrant protections provided by the Supreme Court in 
Karo and Kyllo. Conversely, when considering Knotts, the Maynard 
  
expectation of privacy because he did not take extraordinary precautions against the 
specific way in which the state conducted the surveillance.”). 
 140 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740-41 n.5 (1979). 
 141 Id. 
 142 Katz, 389 U.S. at 357. 
 143 Id. at 359. 
 144 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).  
 145 See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 545.  
 146 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281-82. 
 147 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 559.  
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court simply sidestepped the issue since, in the court’s view, the Su-
preme Court in Knotts had “reserved the issue of prolonged surveil-
lance [and] … [t]hat issue is squarely presented in this case.”148  
The Knotts Court had preserved this issue when faced with the 
concern that upholding the government’s use of warrantless tracking 
would invite “twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this 
country … without judicial knowledge or supervision.”149 Reserving 
the determination for later, the Supreme Court held that “different 
constitutional principles may be applicable” if “such dragnet type law 
enforcement practices … should … occur.”150  Consequently, in sub-
sequent federal cases it became crucial to determine whether “drag-
net” type law enforcement practices were being practiced in the matter 
at bar. Although not wholly in accord, the federal courts have inter-
preted the Supreme Court’s use of the term “dragnet” to represent 
some type of “mass” or “wholesale” surveillance.151 These lower 
courts appear to agree that an indiscriminate network of GPS tracking 
devices affixed to thousands of vehicles to monitor their movements 
is clearly a constitutional violation.152 Yet, prior to the decision in 
Maynard, all federal circuit courts had upheld prolonged warrantless 
GPS tracking of automobiles on “public thoroughfares”153 even 
though the Knotts Court had failed to distinguish how electronic 
tracking of a single individual “is not Fourth Amendment activity but 
that the  
 indiscriminate use against many is.”154 
Nevertheless, application of Knotts within the analytical frame-
work is designed to only identify instances where the warrantless use 
of GPS technology was used by law enforcement in areas our society 
understands are worthy of “protection from government invasion.”155 
This includes travel on private roads that are not visible from public 
locations and automobile movement into private garages or similar 
spaces. In Maynard, travel was wholly within the public space and for 
that reason, the analysis moved to the Fourth Amendment exceptions 
provided by Karo and Kyllo. 
 
  
 148 Id. at 558. 
 149 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 283 (citation omitted). 
 150 Id. at 284. 
 151 United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609-10 (8th Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 152 Marquez, 605 F.3d at 610; Garcia, 474 F.3d at 998. 
 153 Marquez, 605 F.3d 604 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 
591 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2010); Garcia, 474 F.3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). 
 154 LaFave, supra note 19, § 2.7(e), at 762. 
 155 Oliver v. United States, 46 U.S. 170, 178 (1984). 
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D. Applying Karo 
 
When stating the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment, 
the Court in Karo held that warrantless electronic monitoring cannot 
reveal information involuntarily conveyed through public actions 
where visual surveillance would have provided a substitute.156 The 
application of the Karo holding to the facts in Maynard provides an 
exception the Maynard court sought in their analysis. Specifically, 
since in the Maynard court’s opinion law enforcement could not have 
practically conducted a visual surveillance of Jones’ movements over 
the four-week period, the GPS tracking that was performed had no 
non-technological substitute.157 Moreover, in Maynard, the lack of a 
visual surveillance substitute was noted by a Special Agent testifying 
for the prosecution who stated, “[p]hysical surveillance is actually 
hard … [t]here’s always chances of getting spotted … so we decided 
to use GPS technology.”158 So, although Jones’s information was 
“voluntarily conveyed to anyone who wanted to look,”159 the pro-
longed monitoring of Jones violated his legitimate interest in privacy 
under Karo since it “could not have been visually verified.”160 
Nevertheless, while the Maynard court could assert the Karo 
holding establishes a clear exemption from law enforcement’s warran-
tless use of GPS tracking to monitor Jones, not all Fourth Amendment 
experts agree the language within Karo should be interpreted liter-
ally.161 Because of this, analysis of Maynard within the analytical 
framework should advance to the privacy protections provided by 
Kyllo. 
 
E. Applying Kyllo 
 
Despite the support for Jones in Karo, the Supreme Court’s deci-
sion in Kyllo is determinative on the outcome of the analytical frame-
work’s analysis of Maynard. As held by the Court in Kyllo, “obtaining 
by sense-enhancing technology any information … that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without … ‘intrusion into a constitu-
tionally protected area’ constitutes a search … where … the technol-
  
 156 United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984). 
 157 See Maynard, 615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 158 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 565 (citation omitted). 
 159 Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281. 
 160 Karo, 468 U.S. at 715. 
 161 LaFave, supra note 19, § 2.7(e), at 771 (“[I]nconsistency in results is to be 
preferred over an interpretation of Karo whereunder the Court’s ‘could not have been 
obtained through visual surveillance’ language is taken literally.”). 
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ogy in question is not in general public use.”162 Yet, the GPS tracking 
technology used by law enforcement in Maynard: 1) is a device not in 
general public use;163 2) is being used to obtain information that could 
otherwise not be obtained;164 and 3) is intruding on intimate details of 
an individual’s past and current activities.165 Since the Court in Kyllo 
expressed an intent to limit the “power of technology to shrink the 
realm of guaranteed privacy,”166 the Maynard court, given the facts 
surrounding the case, should presume that use of this technology by 
law enforcement violates a justifiable expectation of privacy absent a 
warrant. 
Furthering the restrictive presumption of Kyllo is the Court’s rec-
ognition that “the rule we adopt must take account of more sophisti-
cated systems that are already in use or in development.”167 GPS 
tracking devices used by law enforcement represent precisely the type 
of “extrasensory”168 surveillance systems the Kyllo Court intended to 
prevent from revealing an individual’s “unknowable” information.169 
Moreover, the Court emphasized in Kyllo that the “means” of collect-
ing information matter, and therefore “[t]he fact that equivalent in-
formation could sometimes be obtained by other means does not make 
lawful the use of means that violate the Fourth Amendment.”170  
In Maynard, the means of surveillance, a GPS tracking device not 
in general public use, was used to acquire information that Jones had a 
justifiable expectation of privacy in safeguarding.171 Further, although 
equivalent information theoretically could have been obtained, under 
current Fourth Amendment standards “it should take much more than 
the mere theoretical possibility of a member of the public engaging in 
surveillance of equivalent intensity to undo one’s justified expectation 
of privacy.”172 Consequently, application of Kyllo within the analyti-
cal framework to the facts of Maynard categorizes the warrantless use 
of GPS tracking as a violation of the privacy protection conferred by 
  
 162 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. 
United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961)). 
 163 See Ku, supra note 68, at 1366 (Lacking a definition, “assume that Kyllo’s 
‘general public use’ means what it says: The technology must actually be routinely 
used by the general public and not simply available or used by some portion of the 
public.”); supra Part II. A. 
 164 See supra Part III.C. 
 165 See supra Part II.A. 
 166 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
 167 Id. at 36. 
 168 Hutchins, supra note 46, at 456. 
 169 Id.  
 170 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35 n.2. 
 171 Maynard, 615 F.3d at 549.  
 172 LaFave, supra note 19, § 2.2(e), at 501-02. 
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the Fourth Amendment. To hold otherwise “would be to permit police 
technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amend-
ment.”173 
 
IV.CONCLUSION 
 
Adhering to an analytical framework provided by the Supreme 
Court precedents  of Katz, Knotts, Karo, and Kyllo provides a stan-
dard approach to assessing law enforcement’s need to seek a warrant 
before conducting surveillance of automobile movements. Utilization 
of this framework in United States v. Maynard could have prevented 
the splintering of the standard of review for evaluation of the warran-
tless use of GPS technology by law enforcement while still preserving 
the rights provided by the Fourth Amendment. 
 
  
 173 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34. 
